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Extended Insertion Functions for Opacity Enforcement
Xiaoyan Li, Christoforos N. Hadjicostis, and Zhiwu Li
Abstract— Opacity is a confidentiality property that holds
when certain secret strings of a given system cannot be revealed
to an outside observer under any system activity. Opacity
violations stimulate the study of opacity enforcement strategies.
Among other methodologies, opacity has been enforced using
insertion mechanisms, i.e., output obfuscation mechanisms that
are allowed to insert fictitious output symbols before actual
system outputs, in order to preserve opacity. This paper studies
and analyzes more powerful extended insertion mechanisms,
which can insert symbols before and after an actual system
output, thus, providing opacity to a wider class of systems.
In order to address practical considerations, the paper also
introduces event insertion constraints (i.e., the case when only
specific symbols can be inserted before and/or after an actual
system output). For each case, we construct an appropriate
verifier that can be used to obtain necessary and sufficient
conditions for checking opacity enforceability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security and privacy of cyber-physical systems are in-
creasingly emphasized nowadays considering that network
infrastructures, the underlying mechanisms for exchanging
information within these systems, are threatened and can
become compromised by malicious entities. A hostile en-
tity can selectively attack network infrastructure and cause
immeasurable damage to a system in terms of privacy vio-
lations. Opacity, initially proposed in the computer science
community [1], can be used to capture important security
and privacy properties of an underlying system. Opacity has
also been considered in discrete event systems, such as Petri
nets and automata, to verify and enforce security and privacy
properties in dynamically evolving environments [2]–[8].
In the context of discrete event systems, opacity is a
property that holds when some predefined secrets (e.g.,
certain sequences of events or certain states) of the system
can be kept secret from external observers/intruders [9].
Opacity can be seen as an information-flow property from the
system/defender to the intruder. More specifically, the system
generates an observation (or a sequence of observations), and
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the intruder aims to determine whether the observation (or
the sequence of observations) has necessarily been generated
by secret behavior. Typically, if the secrets cannot be defi-
nitely inferred by the intruder (under any underlying system
behavior), then the system is considered to be opaque.
When opacity is violated, there are four major methods
to enforce it: supervisory control, dynamic observability,
insertion functions and edit functions [10]–[21]. This pa-
per extends the insertion function in [15] by investigating
extended insertion functions and their application to opacity
enforcement. We also consider a scenario in terms of how the
extended insertion mechanism might be constrained. More
specifically, we consider event insertion constraints (EICs),
i.e., situations where only certain symbols can be inserted
before and/or after the observed event.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. The first
contribution concerns the introduction of the notions of
EI-enforceability and EIC-enforceability. A system is EI-
enforceable if opacity can be enforced via the proposed
extended insertion mechanism; and a system with EICs is
EIC-enforceable if opacity can be enforced via the proposed
extended insertion mechanism by inserting only specific
types of events that are allowed. The second contribution
concerns the construction of a verifier, and the development
of necessary and sufficient conditions for checking the fea-
sibility of these two methods of enforcing opacity.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows. Pre-
liminaries are recalled in Section II embracing basic notions,
such as system model, opacity, and insertion functions.
Section III defines extended insertion sequences as well
as EI-enforceability and EIC-enforceability. In Section IV,
the verifier and EIC-verifier constructions are reported and
two necessary and sufficient conditions for EI-enforceability
and EIC-enforceability are developed. Finally, Section V
concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND BACKGROUND
A. Basic Notions and System Model
We use E and E∗ to denote an alphabet and the set of
all finite-length strings of elements of E, respectively. Given
a string s ∈ E∗, its length, denoted by |s|, represents the
number of events in s (the empty string ε is also a member
of E∗ and its length is zero). Given two strings s, t ∈ E∗, the
concatenation of s and t, denoted by st, indicates that the
event sequence captured by t immediately happens after the
occurrence of the event sequence captured by s. For a given
string s ∈ E∗, s∗ represents the set of strings obtained by
concatenating a finite number (but possibly arbitrarily large)
of s (including ε when the number of times we concatenate
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is zero). String s′ ∈ E∗ is called a prefix of s if there exists
s′′ ∈ E∗ such that s = s′s′′, and the set of all prefixes of s is
denoted by s. We use |A| to denote the number of elements
in a set A.
A deterministic finite automaton (DFA) is a four-tuple
Gd = (X ,E, f ,x0), where X is the set of states, E is the set
of events, f : X ×E → X is the possibly partially defined
deterministic transition function, and x0 ∈ X is the initial
state. The transition function f can be extended from X×E
to X×E∗ in a recursive way, which is defined as f (x,es) =
f ( f (x,e),s), where e ∈ E and s ∈ E∗ (specifically, f (x,es)
is undefined if f (x,e) is undefined and we have f (x,ε) = x
for all x ∈ X). The behavior of a given DFA is captured by
its generated language, defined as L(Gd) = {s ∈ E∗| f (x0,s)
is defined}. For a state x ∈ X , we use T (x) = {e| f (x,e) is
defined} to denote the set of transitions that can occur at x,
and F(x) = {e|∃x′ ∈ X{ f (x′,e) = x}} to denote the set of
transitions that can reach x.
A nondeterministic finite automaton (NFA) is a four-tuple
Gnd = (X ,E,δ ,X0), where X is the set of states, E is the set
of events, δ : X ×E → 2X is the nondeterministic transition
function, and X0 ⊆ X is the set of possible initial states.
The transition function δ can be extended from X ×E to
X ×E∗ in a recursive way, which is defined as δ (x,es) =⋃
x′∈δ (x,e) δ (x′,s), where e ∈ E and s ∈ E∗ (specifically,
δ (x,ε) = {x} for all x ∈ X). The behavior of a given NFA
is captured by its generated language, which is defined as
L(Gnd) = {s ∈ E∗|∃x0 ∈ X0{δ (x0,s) 6= /0}}.
In this paper, we consider all events of a DFA as ob-
servable. For an NFA, we assume that some events are
observable and the remaining events are unobservable. Thus,
the set of events of an NFA can be partitioned into two
parts: E = Eo ∪Euo (Eo ∩Euo = /0), where Eo is the set of
observable events and Euo is the set of unobservable events.
The natural projection of an event is defined as P(e) = e if
e ∈ Eo, otherwise P(e) = ε if e ∈ Euo. Given a string s ∈ E∗,
its observation is the output of the natural projection P : E∗→
E∗o , which is defined recursively as P(s) =P(s′e) =P(s′)P(e)
for s = s′e, where s′ ∈ E∗ and e ∈ E.
An NFA Gnd = (X ,Eo ∪ Euo,δ ,X0) can be converted
into a DFA Gd (with all events observable) by obtain-
ing the observer of Gnd that is denoted by Obs(Gnd) =
(Xobs,Eo, fobs,x0,obs) according to the method in [2]. More
specifically, Xobs ⊆ 2X is the state space, Eo is the set of
observable events, fobs : Xobs ×Eo → Xobs is the transition
function, and x0,obs is the initial state. Note that each observer
state xobs ∈ Xobs is associated with a subset of states obtained
from X , i.e., xobs⊆X , and we call xobs ∈Xobs the current state
estimate of system Gnd , sometimes abbreviated by simply
estimate. Consider an NFA Gnd = (X ,Eo ∪Euo,δ ,X0). Let
Obs(Gnd) = (Xobs,Eo, fobs,x0,obs) be the observer. Given a
string s ∈ L(Gnd), the set of all possible states following the
observation P(s) is R(x0,obs,P(s)) = {x∈ X |∃x′ ∈ x0,obs,∃s′ ∈
L(Gnd),s.t. {P(s′) = P(s) ∧ x ∈ δ (x′,s′)}}. Based on the
observations, all estimates can be obtained by tracking the
sequence of observations generated by the system (the initial
estimate is x0,obs = R(X0,ε)) [3].
A DFA Gd = (X ,E, f ,x0) can also be viewed as a directed
graph with X being the set of nodes and {(x, f (x,e))| f (x,e)
is defined} being the set of directed edges. The postset of x
is defined as x• = {x′ ∈ X |∃e∈ E{x′ = f (x,e)}}. A sequence
x1x2...xn, composed of n nodes, is said to be a path, denoted
by p : x1 ⇒ xn, if for all i ∈ {1,2, ...,n− 1} xi+1 ∈ x•i . A
directed graph G is strongly connected if for each pair of
nodes x,x′ in X we have paths p1 : x⇒ x′ and p2 : x′⇒ x. A
subgraph G′ of G is called a strongly connected component
(SCC) if G′ is strongly connected and there is no additional
node from G that can be included in G′ without breaking
the property of being strongly connected. (Note that a single
node x can also be an SCC if there is no other node that
can form an SCC with x). The set of nodes of an SCC is
denoted by XSCC, which can also be used to represent the
corresponding SCC.
B. Opacity and Insertion Functions for Opacity Enforcement
Theorem 1: (Current-state opacity [3]) Given an NFA
Gnd = (X ,Eo ∪ Euo,δ ,X0) with XS ⊆ X being the set of
secret states and Obs(Gnd) = (Xobs,Eo, fobs,x0,obs) being the
corresponding observer (constructed with respect to the set
of observable events Eo), Gnd is current-state opaque if
∀xobs ∈ Xobs{∃x ∈ (X\XS){x ∈ xobs}}.
An estimate xobs ∈ Xobs is called secret or unsafe if for
all x ∈ xobs, x ∈ XS. In the remaining contents, we consider
an estimate as an observer state and a secret estimate as a
secret (observer) state. Given a DFA G = (X ,E, f ,x0) with
XS ⊆ X being the set of secret states, the behavior of the
system L(G) can be partitioned into two disjoint sets: current
state-safe behavior Lcs(G) and current state-unsafe behavior
Lcus(G), which are defined respectively as Lcs(G) = {t|t ∈
L(G) ∧ ( f (x0, t) ∈ (X\XS))} and Lcus(G) = L(G) \ Lcs(G),
respectively. If a system generates a current state-unsafe
observation, the fact that the state of the system is secret
is certain to be revealed.
If a system is nonopaque, the insertion functions proposed
by Wu et al. [15] can be used to attempt to enforce opacity.
To enforce opacity, the system defender needs to make
the unsafe observation look like safe observation by using
insertion functions. The insertion function is applied by
inserting an observable event sequence before the actual
observation. The decision as to what to insert needs to
be made based on the actual observation (as seen last) as
well as the previous observations and the previous insertion
actions that have taken place. To distinguish between events
actually observed versus events virtually inserted, we define
the set of inserted events Ei = {ei|e ∈ E} for a DFA. From
the perspective of an intruder, ei looks like e. Given an
observation s = s[1]s[2]...s[n] ∈ L(Gd) whose length is n,
an insertion sequence is denoted by sI(s) = si[1]si[2]...si[n],
where s[m] represents an actual observable event, si[m] ∈ E∗i
indicates the inserted observable event sequence associated
with s[m], and m ∈ {1,2, ...,n} is a positive integer. After
implementing sI(s) on s, the modified observation sM(s) =
si[1]s[1]si[2]s[2]...si[n]s[n] captures what is observed by the
intruder.
We make the worst-case assumption that the intruder
has perfect knowledge of a given system, which means
that the intruder can distinguish the authenticity of the
received observation according to the transition structure
of the system. The intruder will become suspicious of any
observation that cannot be generated from the system. To
avoid raising suspicion to the intruder, it is essential for the
defender to generate modified observation that matches valid
observation, which can indeed be generated by the system.
Example 1: This example is used to illustrate the inser-
tion sequence and the above descriptions. Consider DFA G
illustrated on the left of Fig. 1, where the set of states is X =
{0,1,2,3,4,5}, the initial state is 0, and the set of observable
events is Eo = E = {a,b,c}. Considering the insertion mech-
anism, we have Ei = {ai,bi,ci}. For an observation s = ba,
we have |s| = 2, s[1] = b, and s[2] = a. Then, the insertion
sequence for s is sI(s) = si[1]si[2] where si[1],si[2] ∈ E∗i ,
and correspondingly the modified observation after imple-
menting sI(s) on s is sM(s) = si[1]s[1]si[2]s[2] = si[1]bsi[2]a.
Suppose that si[1] = ci and si[2] = ai. Then, the modified
observation is sM(s)= cibaia. Since the inserted event ei ∈E∗i
is observationally equivalent to the actual event e ∈ E, the
outside observer will observe sequence cbaa. Obviously, the
insertion sequence si[1]si[2] = ciai is not proper since cbaa /∈
L(G). Suppose that si[1] = ciai and si[2] = aibi. Then, the
modified observation is sM(s)= ciaibaibia. Since the inserted
event ei ∈ E∗i is observationally equivalent to the actual
event e ∈ Ei, the outside observer will observe sequence
cababa. Obviously, the insertion sequence si[1]si[2] = ciaiaibi
is proper since cababa ∈ L(G).
III. EI-ENFORCEABILITY AND
EIC-ENFORCEABILITY
This section starts with a motivating example for which
the insertion mechanism in [15]–[17] cannot enforce opacity,
whereas the proposed extended insertion mechanism is able
to do so. The section discusses how to construct feasible
extended insertion sequences (in order to avoid raising sus-
picion to the intruder), and sustainable extended insertion
sequences (in order to be able to continue inserting symbols
without raising suspicion to the intruder when future activity
is generated by the system). To enforce opacity with a
modified sequence that does not draw the intruder attention
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Fig. 1. DFA G with XS = {2,3} and its insertion automaton.
and can be maintained regardless of the continuation that is
chosen by the system, this section introduces and analyzes
the notion of desirable extended insertion sequences. Based
on desirable extended insertion sequences, EI-enforceability
is presented. More specifically, if for every observation
generated by a system, there exists a desirable extended
insertion sequence, then the system is EI-enforceable.
In order to tackle opacity enforcement under event inser-
tion constraints (EICs), the notions of EIC-feasible extended
insertion sequence, EIC-sustainable extended insertion se-
quence, EIC-desirable extended insertion sequence, and EIC-
enforceability are presented. In the remainder of this section,
we provide a motivating example and then state a number
of definitions that are useful for verifying the two cases of
extended insertion sequences that we mention above.
A. Motivating example
Reconsider the DFA G illustrated on the left of Fig. 1,
where the set of secret states is XS = {2,3}. It is clear
that the system is not current-state opaque since after
event b or c occurs the state of the system is known to
be 3 ∈ XS or 2 ∈ XS. If c happens, the set of possible
insertion event sequences is {ε,biai(ciai)∗} according to
method in [15]–[17]. Consequently, the set of possible altered
event sequences after the implementation of the insertion
sequences is {c,biai(ciai)∗c}. Recall that from the perspec-
tive of an intruder, ei looks like e; thus the intruder observes
the set of sequences {c,ba(ca)∗c} = {c,bac(ac)∗}. It is
obvious that {c,bac(ac)∗} ⊆ Lcus(G). Therefore, we cannot
find an insertion sequence for c to protect secret state 2
from being revealed. From the above descriptions, opacity
of the DFA on the left of Fig. 1 cannot be enforced by the
insertion mechanism proposed by Wu et al. [15]–[17]. On
the other hand, we will see later on that an extended insertion
mechanism can actually ensure opacity for this particular
system.
B. EI-enforceability and EIC-enforceability
Assuming that the observation is s and s[ j] denotes the j-th
observable event, where j ∈ {1,2, ..., |s|}, we use sEI(s) =
sbi[1]sai[1]sbi[2]sai[2]...sbi[|s|]sai[|s|] to denote the correspond-
ing extended insertion sequence of s, where sbi[ j] and sai[ j]
respectively denote the inserted strings before and after the
j-th observable event. Similar to insertion sequences, we use
ei to denote an inserted event.
Given a DFA1 G = (X ,E, f ,x0) with Ei being the set
of inserted events, we will also consider event insertion
constraints (EICs): Ebi and E
a
i , where E
b
i (E
a
i ) represents
the set of observable events that can be inserted before
(after) an actual observed event. We use ebi (eai) to denote
that ebi ∈ Ebi (eai ∈ Eai ) can be inserted before (after) an
actual observed event. In the following parts, Ebi
∗ and Eai
∗
are respectively used to represent the set of all finite-length
1Note that the more general case of an NFA under partial observation can
also be treated by first constructing its observer (which would be a DFA
under full observation) and then performing the analysis that we perform
here using the observer as our DFA.
strings of elements of Ebi and E
a
i (the empty string ε is also
a member of Ebi
∗ and Eai
∗).
In order to analyze strings composed by actual observable
events and inserted observable events, natural projections Pi
and Pui, and mask Mi are introduced. Natural projection Pi
refers to actual events as unobservable, which is defined as
Pi(ei) = ei for ei ∈ Ei, Pi(ebi) = ebi for ebi ∈ Ebi , Pi(eai) = eai
for eai ∈ Eai , and Pi(e) = ε for e ∈ E. Natural projection Pui
refers to inserted events as unobservable, which is defined
as Pui(e) = e for e ∈ E, Pui(ebi) = ε for ebi ∈ Ebi , Pui(eai) =
ε for eai ∈ Eai , and Pui(ei) = ε for ei ∈ Ei. Mask Mi treats
inserted events and actual events as indistinguishable, which
is defined as Mi(ei) = e for ei ∈ Ei, Mi(ebi) = e for ebi ∈ Ebi ,
Mi(eai) = e for eai ∈ Eai , and Mi(e) = e for e ∈ E. Given a
string s, composed of inserted events and actual events, Pi(s)
erases all actual events in s, Pui(s) erases all inserted events
in s, and Mi(s) treats all events in s (regardless of whether
the event is actual or inserted) as actual events.
Definition 1: (Feasible extended insertion sequence) Con-
sider a DFA G = (X ,E, f ,x0) with the set of inserted events
Ei. For an event sequence s ∈ L(G), an extended insertion
sequence sEI(s)= sbi[1]sai[1]sbi[2]sai[2]... sbi[|s|]sai[|s|] is said
to be feasible for s if
∀n ∈ {1,2, ..., |s|}{(s′ = s[1]s[2]...s[n] ∈ s)}
we have Mi(sEM(s′))∈ L(G), where sEM(s′) = sbi[1]s[1]sai[1]
sbi[2]s[2]sai[2]...sbi[n]s[n]sai[n],sbi[k],sai[k] ∈ E∗i ,k ∈ {1,2, ...,
n}, and n is a positive integer.
Definition 2: (Sustainable extended insertion sequence)
Given a DFA G= (X ,E, f ,x0) with Ei and an event sequence
s∈ L(G), an extended insertion sequence sEI(s) = sbi[1]sai[1]
sbi[2]sai[2]...sbi[|s|]sai[|s|] is said to be sustainable for s if:
(1) sEI(s) is feasible for s;
(2) ∀t = t[1]t[2]...t[|t|] ∈ SX(s) with SX(s) = {t|st ∈ L(G)},
we have {∃sEI(t) = tbi[1]tai[1]tbi[2]tai[2]...tbi[|t|]tai[|t|]} s.t.
sEI(st) = sEI(s)sEI(t) is feasible for st.
Definition 3: (Desirable extended insertion sequence)
Given a DFA G = (X ,E, f ,x0) with Ei, set of secret states
XS, and an event sequence s ∈ L(G), an extended insertion
sequence sEI(s) = sbi[1]sai[1]sbi[2]sai[2]...sbi[|s|]sai[|s|] is said
to be desirable for s if:
(1) sEI(s) is sustainable;
(2) Mi(sEM(s)) ∈ Lcs(G).
Definition 4: (EI-enforceability) A DFA G= (X ,E, f ,x0),
with Ei and set of secret states XS, is said to be EI-enforceable
if
∀s ∈ L(G){(∃sEI(s)}
such that sEI(s) is a desirable extended insertion sequence.
When considering insertion constraints on events, if sbi[k]
and sai[k] in Definition 1 satisfy sbi[k]∈ Eb∗i and sai[k]∈ Ea∗i ,
then the feasible extended insertion sequence sEI(s) would
be EIC-feasible. It is not hard to see that the sustainable
extended insertion sequence would be EIC-sustainable if
the feasible extended insertion sequence in Definition 2
is required to be EIC-feasible (with sEI(t) also satisfying
the EICs); and the desirable extended insertion sequence
would be EIC-desirable if the sustainable extended insertion
sequence in Definition 3 is required to be EIC-sustainable.
Correspondingly, if the desirable extended insertion sequence
in Definition 4 is required to be EIC-desirable, then a DFA
would be EIC-enforceable.
IV. VERIFICATION FOR EI-ENFORCEABILITY
AND EIC-ENFORCEABILITY
This section elaborates on how to built a verifier (EIC-
verifier) that can be used to decide whether system opacity
can be enforced via an extended insertion mechanism under
no constraints (under event insertion constraints). Based on
the obtained verifier (EIC-verifier), a necessary and sufficient
condition to determine whether the system is EI-enforceable
(EIC-enforceable) is presented.
A. Verification for EI-enforceability
Definition 5: (Insertion automaton) Given a DFA G =
(X ,E, f ,x0), the insertion automaton is given by G f =
(X f ,E∪Ei, fi,x f ,0), where X f =X , x f ,0 = x0, and fi is defined
as fi(x f ,e) = f (x f ,e) (denoted by solid lines) for x f ∈ X f
and e ∈ E, and fi(x f ,ei) = x f (denoted by dashed lines) for
x f ∈ X f and ei ∈ Ei.
Definition 6: (Indicator automaton) Given a DFA G =
(X ,E, f ,x0) and its insertion automaton G f = (X f ,E ∪ Ei,
fi,x f ,0), the indicator automaton is the dashed product of G
and G f , denoted by GIA =G×d G f = (XIA,E∪Ei, fIA,xIA,0),
where
(1) XIA = {(x,x f )|x ∈ X ,x f ∈ X f } is the set of states;
(2) E∪Ei is the set of events, where Ei is the set of inserted
events and ei ∈ Ei is observationally equivalent to e ∈ E;
(3) xIA,0 = (x0,x f ,0) is the initial state;
(4) fIA is the transition function defined as follows: (i)
fIA((x,x f ),e) = ( f (x,e), fi(x f ,e)) if both f (x,e) and fi(x f ,e)
are defined, denoted by solid lines, and (ii) fIA((x,x f ),ei) =
( f (x,e), fi(x f ,ei)) if both f (x,e) and fi(x f ,ei) are defined,
denoted by dashed lines.
Lemma 1: Consider a DFA G = (X ,E, f ,x0). Let G f =
(X f ,E ∪Ei, fi,x f ,0) be the corresponding insertion automa-
ton and GIA = (XIA,E ∪Ei, fIA,xIA,0) be the corresponding
indicator automaton. Indicator automaton GIA enumerates all
feasible extended insertion sequences. 
Due to space limitation, the proof here is omitted. For
same reason, all proofs in the remainder of paper are also
omitted. They will be made available in an extended version
of the paper.
Example 2: From Definition 5, an insertion automaton
is effectively obtained by inserting all observable events
as self loops at each state of the given automaton. As an
example, consider the DFA on the left of Fig. 1. After
adding self-loops with all observable events at each state,
the corresponding insertion automaton can be obtained, as
illustrated on the right of Fig. 1. Following Definition 6, the
indicator automaton is obtained as depicted in Fig. 2.
Given an indicator automaton GIA = (XIA,E ∪
Ei, fIA,xIA,0) = (X ,E, f ,x0) ×d (X f ,E ∪ Ei, fi,x f ,0)
with X = {x1,x2, ...,x|X |}, the state space XIA can
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Fig. 2. Indicator automaton of the DFA on the left of Fig. 1.
be partitioned into |X | mutually disjoint subspaces:
XIA = XIA(x1) ∪ XIA(x2) ∪ ... ∪ XIA(x|X |), where
XIA(xk) = {xIA = (x,x f )∈XIA|x f = xk} is the set of first-level
state subspaces and k ∈ {1,2, ..., |X |} is the index of state
xk. Furthermore, the set of states (state subspace) XIA(xk)
can be divided into nk mutually disjoint (note here that n
is a function of k) strongly connected components (SCCs):
XIA(xk) = X
SCC1
IA (xk) ∪ XSCC2IA (xk) ∪ ... ∪ X
SCCnk
IA (xk), where
X
SCCmk
IA (xk) is a second-level subspace, mk ∈ {1,2, ...,nk}
and nk is a positive integer denoting the number of
SCCs obtained from XIA(xk). In this paper, Tarjan
Algorithm from [22] is used to obtain the SCCs of each
subgraph of GIA with XIA(xk) being the set of nodes and
{(xIA, fIA(xIA,ei))|xIA ∈ XIA(xk) ∧ fIA(xIA,ei) ∈ XIA(xk) is
defined} being the set of directed edges.
Definition 7: (Trapping SCC) Let X
SCCmk
IA (xk) be a second-
level state subspace of GIA = (XIA,E ∪ Ei, fIA, xIA,0) =
(X ,E, f ,x0)×d (X f ,E ∪ Ei, fi,x f ,0). The second-level sub-
space X
SCCmk
IA (xk) is said to be trapping if it satisfies the
following two conditions: (1) ∀xIA ∈ XSCCmkIA (xk) and ∀e ∈
T (xk), fIA(xIA,e) is not defined; and (2) ∀xIA ∈ XSCCmkIA (xk)
and ∀ei ∈ Ei, we have fIA(xIA,ei)∈ XSCCmkIA (xk) or fIA(xIA,ei)
is not defined.
Definition 8: (Verifier) Given an indicator automaton
GIA = (XIA,E ∪ Ei, fIA,xIA,0) = (X ,E, f , x0)×d (X f ,E ∪ Ei,
fi,x f ,0), a subgraph of GIA, denoted by GTV = (XTV ,E ∪
Ei, fTV ,xTV ,0), is said to be a verifier if trapping SCCs are
iteratively pruned and only the part of the automaton that is
accessible from the initial state is kept.
Example 3: Consider the indicator automaton in Fig. 2.
The whole state space in Fig. 2 can be partitioned into six
first-level state subspaces since G has six states. The first-
level state subspaces are separately bounded in the figure by
red lines. A first-level state subspace can be categorized into
several second-level subspaces that are bounded by green
lines; this categorization depends on how many SCCs can be
captured within the corresponding first-level state subspace.
Consider the second-level subspace XSCCIA (4)= {(3,4),(5,4)}
as an example. It is obvious that (1) ∀xIA ∈ {(3,4),(5,4)}
and ∀e ∈ T (4) = {b}, fIA(xIA,e) is not defined (neither
fIA((3,4),b) is defined nor fIA((5,4),b) is defined); and (2)
∀xIA ∈ {(3,4),(5,4)} and ∀ei ∈ Ei we have fIA(xIA,ei) ∈
{(3,4),(5,4)} or fIA(xIA,ei) is undefined, which means
that the second-level subspace XSCCIA (4) is trapping. After
iteratively pruning all trapping SCCs and taking accessible
part from initial state, the verifier is obtained as shown in
Fig. 2 if we exclude the SCCs filled with color green and
their incoming events.
Definition 9: (Staying nonblocking SCC in a veri-
fier) Consider an indicator automaton GIA = (XIA,E ∪
Ei, fIA,xIA,0) = (X ,E, f , x0) ×d (X f ,E ∪ Ei, fi,x f ,0) and
its verifier GV = (XV ,E ∪ Ei, fV ,xV,0). The second-level
subspace X
SCCmk
V (xk) is said to be staying nonblocking
if ∀e ∈ T (xk) {∃xV ∈ XSCCmk↑V (xk){ fV (xV ,e) is defined}},
where X
SCCmk↑
V (xk) = {X
SCCm′k
V (xk)|∃ xV ∈ X
SCCmk
V (xk), x
′
V ∈
X
SCCm′k
V (xk), and sbi ∈ E∗i { fV (xV ,sbi) = x′V}}. Let XV SNB
denote the set of states that lie in staying nonblocking SCCs
in GV .
Lemma 2: Consider a DFA G=(X ,E, f ,x0) and construct
its indicator automaton GIA = (XIA,E ∪ Ei, fIA,xIA,0) and
verifier GV = (XV ,E ∪Ei, fV ,xV,0). Let XV SNB be the set of
states that lie in staying nonblocking SCCs. The verifier
enumerates all sustainable extended insertion sequences as
the modified sequences that can reach a state in XV SNB. 
Definition 10: (Admissible state in a verifier) Given a
DFA G = (X ,E, f ,x0) with XS ⊆ X being the set of secret
states, GV = (XV ,E∪Ei, fV ,xV,0) being its verifier, and xV SNB
being its set of states that lie in staying nonblocking SCCs,
a state xV SNB = (x,x f ) ∈ XV SNB is said to be admissible if
x ∈ (X\XS). The set of admissible states is denoted by XVA.
For xV SNB = (x,x f )∈ XV SNB, x is the dummy state that can
be erroneously inferred by an intruder and x f is the genuine
state of the system. To protect the privacy of the system, the
secret states cannot be exposed to the intruder. Therefore, if
the dummy state x is not secret then the state xV SNB = (x,x f )
is admissible regardless of whether the genuine state x f is
secret or not.
Theorem 2: Let GV = (XV ,E ∪Ei, fV ,xV,0) be the verifier
of a DFA G = (X ,E, f ,x0) with XS ⊆ X being the set of
secret states. The automaton G is EI-enforceable if and only
if
∀x f ∈ X f {∃xV = (x,x f ) ∈ XVA},
where XVA is the set of admissible states of the verifier GV .

Example 4: Consider the verifier GV in Fig. 2 (without
the SCCs filled with color green and their incoming
events). Second-level subspace XSCCV (0) = {(0,0)} is
staying nonblocking since for all e ∈ T (0) = {a,b,c},
we have that fV ((0,0),e) is defined ( fV ((0,0),a),
fV ((0,0),b), and fV ((0,0),c) are all defined). For this
example, all staying nonblocking SCCs are filled with
color red as shown in Fig. 2, and we have XV SNB = {(0,0),
(1,1),(2,1),(3,1),(4,1),(5,1),(2,2),(4,2),(3,3),(5,3),(4,4),
(2,4),(5,5),(3,5)}. The states (2,2) and (2,4) are not
admissible while (4,1) and (4,2) are admissible. For states
(2,2) and (2,4), dummy state 2 is secret implying that
both of these states are not admissible. States (4,1) and
(4,2) are admissible since dummy state 4 is not secret.
Overall, the set of admissible states is XVA = {(0,0),(1,1),
(4,1),(5,1),(4,2),(5,3),(4,4),(5,5)}. Based on Theorem 2,
the DFA on the left of Fig. 1 is EI-enforceable.
B. Verification for EIC-enforceability
This section concentrates on verification for EIC-
enforceability, i.e., whether a nonopaque system with EICs
can be turned into an opaque one via an extended insertion
mechanism. Similar to the verification for EI-enforceability,
we construct an EIC-verifier, based on which a necessary
and sufficient condition is presented to determine whether
the considered system with EICs is EIC-enforceable.
Definition 11: (EIC-insertion automaton) Given a DFA
G = (X ,E, f ,x0) with EICs captured by Ebi and E
a
i , the
EIC-insertion automaton is a DFA GEIC = (X f ,E ∪Ebi ∪Eai ,
fi,x f ,0), where
1) X f = X ∪Xa∪Xb∪Xab is the set of states, with
a) Xa = {xa|x ∈ X}
b) Xb = {xb|x ∈ X}
c) Xab = {xab|x ∈ X}.
2) x f ,0 = x0 is the initial state.
3) the state transition function fi is defined as follows:
a) state transition function associated with actual
observable events (denoted by solid lines):
i) fi(x,e) = f (x,e) for x ∈ X and e ∈ E.
ii) fi(xa,e) = f (x,e) for xa ∈ Xa and e ∈ E.
iii) fi(xb,e) = f (x,e) for xb ∈ Xb and e ∈ E.
iv) fi(xab,e) = f (x,e) for xab ∈ Xab and e ∈ E.
b) state transition function associated with inserted
observable events (denoted by dashed lines):
i) fi(x,eai) = xa for x ∈ X and eai ∈ Eai .
ii) fi(x,ebi) = xb for x ∈ X and ebi ∈ Ebi .
iii) fi(xa,eai) = xa for xa ∈ Xa and eai ∈ Eai .
iv) fi(xa,ebi) = xab for xa ∈ Xa and ebi ∈ Ebi .
v) fi(xb,ebi) = xb for xb ∈ Xb and ebi ∈ Ebi .
vi) fi(xab,ebi) = xab for xab ∈ Xab and ebi ∈ Ebi .
Suppose that the original system has a state x with F(x) =
{e1,e2, ...,eu} and T (x) = {e′1,e′2, ...,e′v}, where u and v are
two positive integers. We explain Definition 11 in Fig. 3,
where we simply use Eai to denote that all eai ∈ Eai can
be inserted after and Ebi to denote that all ebi ∈ Ebi can be
inserted before. In Fig. 3, xa represents the system actual
state x reached by inserting virtual events (that can only be
inserted after an actual observed event) after an observed
event e ∈ {e1,e2, ...,eu}; xb represents the system actual
state x reached by inserting virtual events (that can only be
inserted before an actual observed event) before an observed
x
xbxa
xab
EibEia
Eib
e1
e2 eu
...
e1＇
e2＇
ev＇
...
Eia
Eib
Eib
Fig. 3. Illustration for EIC-insertion automaton.
event e′ ∈ {e′1,e′2, ...,e′v}; and xab represents the system actual
state x reached by first inserting virtual events (that can only
be inserted after an actual observed event) after an observed
event e∈ {e1,e2, ...,eu} and then inserting virtual events (that
can only be inserted before an actual observed event) before
an observed event e′ ∈ {e′1,e′2, ...,e′v}. At all states x, xa, xb,
and xab, event e ∈ E satisfying e ∈ T (x) can occur since
the inserted event does not influence the system operation
(refer to 3.(a) in Definition 11); at state x event eai ∈ Eai
and ebi ∈ Ebi can both be inserted (refer to 3.(b)(i) and (ii) in
Definition 11); at state xa event eai ∈Eai and ebi ∈Ebi can both
be inserted (refer to 3.(b)(iii) and (iv) in Definition 11); at
state xb only event ebi ∈ Ebi can be inserted (refer to 3.(b)(v)
in Definition 11); and at state xab only event ebi ∈ Ebi can be
inserted (refer to 3.(b)(vi) in Definition 11).
Remark 1: Following the proposed extended insertion
mechanism, an intruder can only observe state x or xa. When
the system is at initial state x0, we only need to decide what
to insert before the next observed event, which means that
x0a and x0ab can be deleted in EIC-insertion automaton if the
system cannot reach the initial state x0 during subsequent op-
eration (this holds if F(x0) = /0), otherwise x0a and x0ab need
to be retained (i.e., if the system can reach the initial state
x0 during subsequent operation which holds if F(x0) 6= /0).
Example 5: Consider the DFA in Fig. 1. Assuming that
b,c ∈ E are allowed to be inserted before an actual observed
event, and a ∈ E is allowed to be inserted after an actual
observed event, then we have Ebi = {bbi,cbi} and Eai = {aai}.
Note that at initial state x0 we have F(x0) = /0, implying that
only ebi ∈ Ebi can be inserted at x0. Based on Definition 11,
the EIC-insertion automaton of the DFA in Fig. 1 with Ebi =
{bbi,cbi} and Eai = {aai} is obtained as illustrated in Fig. 4.
Notice that an arc associated with an event e ∈ E from a
rectangle represents that event e causes a transition from all
states that belong in the rectangle to the state indicated. For
instance, fi(0,a) = 1 and fi(0b,a) = 1.
Definition 12: (EIC-indicator automaton) Given a DFA
G = (X ,E, f ,x0) with Ebi and E
a
i and its EIC-insertion au-
tomaton GEIC = (X f ,E ∪Ebi ∪Eai , fi,x f ,0), the EIC-indicator
automaton is the EIC-dashed product of G and GEIC, denoted
by GEIA = G×EIC−d GEIC = (XEIA,E ∪Ebi ∪Eai , fEIA,xEIA,0)
where
(1) XEIA = {(x,x f )|x ∈ X ,x f ∈ X f } is the set of states;
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Fig. 4. EIC-insertion automaton of the DFA in Fig. 1 with Ebi = {bbi,cbi}
and Eai = {aai}.
(2) E ∪Ebi ∪Eai is the set of events, where Ebi and Eai are
respectively the set of events that can be inserted before and
after an actual observed event, and ebi ∈ Ebi and eai ∈ Eai are
observationally equivalent to e ∈ E;
(3) xEIA,0 = (x0,x f ,0) is the initial state;
(4) fEIA is the transition function defined as follows:
(i) fEIA((x,x f ),e) = ( f (x,e), fi(x f ,e)) if both f (x,e)
and fi(x f ,e) are defined, denoted by solid lines, (ii)
fEIA((x,x f ),ebi) = ( f (x,e), fi(x f ,ebi)) if both f (x,e) and
fi(x f ,ebi) are defined, denoted by dashed lines, and (iii)
fEIA((x,x f ),eai) = ( f (x,e), fi(x f ,eai)) if both f (x,e) and
fi(x f ,eai) are defined, denoted by dashed lines.
Lemma 3: Consider a DFA G = (X ,E, f ,x0). Let GEIC =
(X f ,E∪Ebi ∪Eai , fi,x f ,0) be the corresponding EIC-insertion
automaton and GEIA = (XEIA,E∪Ebi ∪Eai , fEIA,xEIA,0) be the
corresponding EIC-indicator automaton. EIC-indicator au-
tomaton GEIA enumerates all EIC-feasible extended insertion
sequences. 
Definition 13: (EIC-trapping state) Consider an EIC-
indicator automaton GEIA = (XEIA,E∪Ebi ∪Eai , fEIA, xEIA,0).
A state xEIA ∈ XEIA is EIC-trapping if it satisfies the follow-
ing conditions: (1) ∀e ∈ E, fEIA(xEIA,e) is not defined; (2)
∀ebi ∈ Ebi , fEIA(xEIA,ebi) is not defined; and (3) ∀eai ∈ Eai ,
fEIA(xEIA,eai) is not defined.
Definition 14: (EIC-verifier) Given an EIC-indicator au-
tomaton GEIA = (XEIA,E ∪Ebi ∪Eai , fEIA,xEIA,0), a subgraph
of GEIA, denoted by GEV = (XEV ,E ∪Ei, fEV ,xEV ,0), is said
to be an EIC-verifier if EIC-trapping states are iteratively
pruned and only the part of the automaton that is accessible
from the initial state is kept.
Example 6: Consider the DFA in Fig. 1 with Ebi =
{bbi,cbi} and Eai = {aai}. Following Definition 12, the cor-
responding EIC-indicator automaton is illustrated in Fig. 5.
According to Definition 13, states (2,4b) and (3,5b) are EIC-
trapping. Following Definition 14, after pruning them, the
corresponding EIC-verifier can be obtained as illustrated in
Fig. 5 if we exclude the states that are filled with the color
green (and arrows from/to them).
We use XEV (x) = {(x′,x) ∈ XEV} ∪ {(x′,xa) ∈ XEV} ∪
{(x′,xb)∈ XEV}∪{(x′,xab)∈ XEV} to denote the set of states
associated with the system actual state x in an EIC-verifier.
Given an EIC-verifier GEV = (XEV ,E∪Ebi ∪Eai , fEV ,xEV,0) =
(X ,E, f ,x0) ×EIC−d (X f ,E ∪ Ebi ∪ Eai , fi,x f ,0) with X =
{x1,x2, ...,x|X |}, the state space XEV can be divided into
|X | mutually disjoint subspaces: XEV = XEV (x1)∪XEV (x2)∪
... ∪ XEV (x|X |), where XEV (xk) is the set of first-level
state subspaces and k ∈ {1,2, ..., |X |} is the index of
state xk. Furthermore, the set of states (state subspace)
XEV (xk) can be divided into 4 mutually disjoint sub-
spaces, i.e., XEV (xk) = XEV 1(xk) ∪ XEV 2(xk) ∪ XEV 3(xk) ∪
XEV 4(xk), where XEV 1(xk) = {xEV = (x′,xk)|xEV ∈ XEV (xk)},
XEV 2(xk) = {xEV = (x′,xka)|xEV ∈ XEV (xk)}, XEV 3(xk) =
{xEV = (x′,xkb)|xEV ∈ XEV (xk)}, and XEV 4(xk) = {xEV =
(x′,xkab)|xEV ∈ XEV (xk)} are the sets of second-level state
subspaces.
Definition 15: (Staying EIC-nonblocking state) Consider
an EIC-verifier GEV = (XEV ,E ∪Ebi ∪Eai , fEV ,xEV ,0).
(1) A state xEV ∈XEV 1(xk) is type-1 staying EIC-nonblocking
if ∀e ∈ T (xk){∃x′EV ∈ {xEV}∪x→EV{ fEV (x′EV ,e) is defined}},
where x→EV = {x′′EV ∈ XEV 3(xk)|∃sbi ∈ Eb∗i { fEV (xEV ,sbi) =
x′′EV}} denotes the set of follow-on states of xEV .
(2) A state xEV ∈XEV 2(xk) is type-2 staying EIC-nonblocking
if ∀e ∈ T (xk){∃x′EV ∈ {xEV}∪x↑EV{ fEV (x′EV ,e) is defined}},
where x↑EV = {x′′EV ∈ XEV 4(xk)|∃sbi ∈ Eb∗i { fEV (xEV ,sbi) =
x′′EV}} denotes the set of follow-on states of xEV .
(3) Let XEV NB denote the set of type-1 and type-2 staying
EIC-nonblocking states in GEV .
Lemma 4: Consider a DFA G = (X ,E, f ,x0). Let GEV =
(XEV ,E∪Ebi ∪Eai , fEV ,xEV ,0) be the EIC-verifier and XEV NB
be the set of type-1 and type-2 staying EIC-nonblocking
states in GEV . The EIC-verifier enumerates all EIC-
sustainable extended insertion sequences as the sequences
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Fig. 5. EIC-indicator automaton of the DFA in Fig. 1 with Ebi = {bbi,cbi}
and Eai = {aai}.
that reach a state in XEV NB. 
Definition 16: (EIC-admissible state in an EIC-verifier)
Consider a DFA G = (X ,E, f ,x0) with its set of secret
states XS ⊆ X , event insertion constraints Ebi and Eai , and
EIC-verifier GEV = (XEV ,E ∪ Ebi ∪ Eai , fEV ,xEV ,0). A state
xEV = (x,x′) ∈ XEV NB is said to be EIC-admissible if x ∈
(X\XS), where XEV NB is the set of type-1 and type-2 staying
EIC-nonblocking states. Let XEVA denote the set of EIC-
admissible states in GEV .
Theorem 3: Let GEV = (XEV ,E ∪Ebi ∪Eai , fEV ,xEV ,0) be
the EIC-verifier of a DFA G = (X ,E, f ,x0) with its set of
secret states XS ⊆ X and event insertion constraints Ebi and
Eai . The automaton G is EIC-enforceable if and only if
∀x ∈ X{∃xEV ∈ XEVA},
where XEVA is the set of EIC-admissible states of GEV . 
Example 7: As an example, consider the EIC-verifier
illustrated in Fig. 5 (without the states filled with color green
and their incoming events). We have six first-level subspaces
as follows: XEV (0) = {(0,0),(2,0b),(3,0b)},XEV (1) =
{(1,1),(4,1),(5,1),(1,1a),(2,1b),(3,1b)},XEV (2) =
{(2,2),(4,2a),(2,2ab)},XEV (3) = {(3,3),(5,3a),(3,3ab)},
XEV (4) = {(4,4)}, and XEV (5) = {(5,5)}. According to
Definition 15, for state xEV = (4,1) ∈ XEV 1(1), we have
x→EV = {(2,1b)}, which indicates that (4,1) is type-1 staying
(1,1)-nonblocking since for all e ∈ T (1) = {a}, there exists
x′EV = (2,1b) ∈ x→EV ∪ {xEV} = {(4,1),(2,1b)} such that
fEV (x′EV ,e) is defined. According to Definition 15, for
state xEV = (4,2a) ∈ XEV 2(2), we have x↑EV = {(2,2ab)},
which indicates that (4,2a) is type-2 staying EIC-
nonblocking since for all e ∈ T (2) = {a}, there
exists x′EV = (2,2ab) ∈ x↑EV ∪ {xEV} = {(4,2a),(2,2ab)}
such that fEV (x′EV ,e) is defined. In conclusion, states
(0,0),(1,1),(4,1),(5,1),(2,2),(3,3),(4,4) and (5,5) are
type-1 staying EIC-nonblocking; and (1,1a),(4,2a) and
(5,3a) are type-2 staying EIC-nonblocking (these states are
filled with color red as shown in Fig. 5). We use XEV NB to
denote the set of type-1 and type-2 staying EIC-nonblocking
states in an EIC-verifier; in this example, we have XEV NB =
{(0,0),(1,1),(4,1),(5,1),(2,2),(3,3),(4,4),(5,5),(1,1a),
(4,2a),(5,3a)}. There are nine EIC-admissible states in
total, i.e., XEVA = {(0,0),(1,1),(4,1),(5,1),(1,1a),(4,2a),
(5,3a),(4,4),(5,5)} according to Definition 16. According
to Theorem 3, the system is EIC-enforceable.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this paper, we have introduced an extended insertion
mechanism in order to enforce current-state opacity in dis-
crete event systems that are modeled as fully observable
DFAs. This is not a restriction as the approach can be
extended to partially observable NFAs by first constructing
their observer (which is a fully observable DFA). Event
insertion constraints (EICs) have been also considered in
order to address practical limitations. EI-enforceability of
a system is presented to decide whether the opacity of
the system can be enforced by the proposed mechanism,
and EIC-enforceability of a system with EICs is presented
to decide whether opacity of the system can be enforced
by the proposed mechanism. To verify EI-enforceability or
EIC-enforceability, an appropriate verifier or EIC-verifier
is constructed, and necessary and sufficient conditions are
developed. In the future, we will investigate how to enforce
opacity of a system with other constraints via the proposed
extended insertion mechanism.
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